

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

9 June 1958

Chief, Geographic Research

GRA Comments on "Proposed Organization of the Intelligence Component of CIA Theater Force Headquarters in Time of War"

REFERENCE: Memorandum to IAD's from Asst. to DD/I (Planning), same subject, dated 19 May 1958

1. The most important thing about the proposed T/O is the progress it represents. It is an encouraging sign that, before long, we can hope to have a true War Plan in the DD/I.

2. My reactions otherwise are somewhat critical. What follows below has been checked out with my senior people, who -- as you know -- possess between them a sizeable body of experience in intelligence operations under wartime conditions.

3. We feel, first of all, that the proposed T/O is inclined toward too great detail. We would recommend the following changes:

a. Delete "teams" shown under the Current Intelligence and Analysis Branches and replace them by gross lists of Officer and EM positions. In the utilization of his personnel, the Branch Chief concerned should establish his teams in the size and number appropriate to the requirements placed on him and be able to utilize personnel capabilities in any organizational framework necessary for accomplishing the task.

b. Drop the designation of Analysis Branch slots according to "geographer", "political scientist", and "economist" disciplines. Such a designation fits only a theoretical situation and emphasizes distinctions which we feel are inappropriate to intelligence team operations. The fact is that "Intelligence Officers" are required, who are able to perform a variety of specific tasks for large and small regions of the world. Previous war plans, and [REDACTED] covering memorandum, would indicate that most of the tasks to be done will require talents generally employed by geographers. However, this does not mean that such slots are reserved for the GRA, but rather for men who can perform the duties specified. We recommend, therefore, that the present notation of disciplines be replaced somewhere else in the War Plan by a listing of specific tasks to be performed by the Analysis Branch (such as unconventional warfare

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target studies, route handbooks, analysis of tribal groupings and customs), together with a statement of professional requirements for each task. When the war arrives, it will be clear enough in the DD/I whose MOS fits the requirements, task by task.


4. We are disturbed that the proposed T/O should overlook the Agency's responsibilities for foreign map procurement. It also fails to note field requirements for map reference services. According to previous planning, 5 personnel in each Theater Force will be responsible for the procurement of foreign maps according to coordinated headquarters requirements, and for the provision of map reference services to the CIA Theater Force Commander. Such a team would fit best under the Technical Support Branch of the T/O, as proposed.

5. If World War II and the Korean War can be taken as guides, the staff envisaged by the T/O would seem in places to be too small for its varied mission. We appreciate that the intent here may be only to outline a basic unit which can be expanded as circumstances indicate. However, parts of the T/O are unrealistic. It seems to overlook the fact, for instance, that some operations must be on a three-shift, 24-hour-day basis for extended periods. It also appears to incorporate too great a span of control at the top. We would recommend the following:

- a. Double the size of the PI Teams to 10 personnel. This figure is derived from ample experience and has been incorporated in previous war planning.
- b. Increase the Cartography Team from the present 5 personnel to 8 personnel. This also conforms with experience and previous war planning.
- c. Add an Executive Officer and a Message Center (3 additional EM) to the Office of the Chief of the Intelligence Component.
- d. Change the Current Intelligence and Analysis Branches to Sections and place them under an "Operations Branch". The purpose here is to assure essential coordination between the current reporting and basic research functions, increase the scope and effectiveness of finished intelligence programs, and reduce the Intelligence Chief's span of control from five branches to four.

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6. We feel that the T/O, and its appended Descriptive Functions, should reflect a degree of coordination with personnel of the Military Services. Close contact between field intelligence components is essential and inevitable in war. The Theater J-2 will place joint requirements on intelligence components of Army, Navy, and Air, and it is most likely that the CIA Force will be required to participate also. The CIA Intelligence Component will be obligated, like the Military Services, to contribute -- perhaps even to coordinate -- handbooks, annexes to operations plans, area and paywar studies, and other projects of joint interest. This will not be disadvantageous to CIA. It demonstrates, we think, another reason why the T/O as finally accepted should specify slots and grades in general terms, and identify missions, functions, and substantive capabilities in detail.


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